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LEGAL OBLIGATION AND THE
NATURAL LAW
R. George Wright*
Ever since the speeches of Callicles in the Gorgias' and
Thrasymachus in the Republic,2 the problem of legal obligation
has continued to obtrude itself into our jurisprudence. By defini-
tion, we are legally bound to obey the commands of the law. But to
what extent, if any, does this legal obligation correspond to or re-
flect any moral obligation to obey?3 The thesis of this Article is
that the search for a moral justification for legal obligation cannot
remain a narrow, discretely cabined inquiry. As it turns out, the
question of legal obligation cannot be answered without raising the
question of how to identify a just polity, or the features of a gov-
ernment worthy of obedience. But the question of the just political
society itself raises broader questions concerning the nature of
moral reasoning and of moral justification in general. This Article
recognizes that it is possible for us to pronounce the problem of
justifying legal obligation to be insoluble. To abandon the search,
however, would be to grant that as among the regimes of Jefferson,
Stalin, Pol Pot, and George Bush, no real differences exist in the
moral status of each regime's demand for obedience. One's obliga-
tion to obey each regime would be simply a matter of morally arbi-
trary convention, and one's choice to obey or not to obey an ex-
pression of convention or mere arbitrary preference or taste.
This Article will for the most part assume, however, that we cur-
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rently have at least an arbitrary preference to avoid such a result,
if possible. But again, no narrowly circumscribed solution to the
problem of justifying legal obligation seems possible. Rather, the
narrowest possible affirmative solution to the problem of the moral
character of legal obligation involves recourse to what is recogniza-
bly a natural law approach. Not just any recognizably natural law
approach will suffice, however. If we are to solve the problem of
legal obligation in an affirmative way, we are led inevitably to a
single possible solution involving a distinctively, unmistakably,
theistic version of the natural law. It is something of an under-
statement to suggest that proving such a solution works is a task
beyond the scope of this Article. But some effort will be expended
on showing not merely that the choice really is as stark as we have
supposed, but that the theistic natural law approach is susceptible
of progressive development and not without contemporary plausi-
bility and intellectual appeal.
I. LEGAL OBLIGATION AND THE STATE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORY
A review of contemporary writing on the problem of legal obliga-
tion leaves one with the impression not so much of pluralism, but
of disarray and of uncontrolled disintegration. From the time of
Plato's Crito4 at least until recently, the search for a moral obliga-
tion to obey the law was thought to be a meaningful, intelligible
question even if it put into question the moral soundness of an
institution or of an established social practice of conventional obe-
dience.5 Sometimes, the question was thought to call for a gener-
ally negative, or philosophically anarchistic answer.6 More typi-
cally, though, at least a prima facie general obligation of obedience
has been thought to be derivable on one or more of several theo-
ries. The most popular of these arguments have been distinguished
by Professor Greenawalt as promise, benefit, or need-based
theories.7
This is not to suggest that any of the possible justifications for legal obligation found
within the Crito have been found generally persuasive. See Weinrib, Obedience To the Law
in Plato's Crito, 27 AM. J. JURIS. 85, 86 (1982).
1 See Gewirth, Obligation: Political, Legal, Moral, 12 NoMos: POL. AND LEOAL OBLIGATION
55, 60-61 & n.6 (1970).
6 See generally R. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970). Contra J. REIMAN, IN DE-
FENSE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1972).
See Greenawalt, Promise, Benefit, and Need: Ties That Bind Us to the Law, 18 GA. L.
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Promise-based, contractual, or consent-based theories of legal
obligation take on their most familiar form in the writings of John
Locke.' Roughly, one is morally obligated to obey the law because
one has in some sense voluntarily agreed to do so. Benefit- or grati-
tude-based theories, in contrast, view the moral obligation of obe-
dience to the law as springing from the gratitude we feel, or ought
to feel, for benefits conferred on us by the state or by our fellow
citizens acting through the state.' Need- or utility-based theories,
finally, argue that general obedience to the law is morally binding
at least where it is of great social value, or where it makes possible
the good of a recognizable social and political life.'0
It is natural to ask whether any of these theories work, or is cor-
rect in some objective sense, or, on the evidence, is a more reasona-
ble or justified theory than the others. To borrow a phrase from
John Stuart Mill, can "considerations... be presented capable of
determining the intellect ... to give ... its assent."" in favor of
any of the theories? The answer, as it turns out, is "no." The vast
relevant literature cannot be briefly summarized. But it seems
clear that each theory referred to above fails in the sense that ob-
jectors can inevitably make just as rational an argument for re-
jecting the proferred theory of legal obligation. If it is the goal of
the proponents to establish their own theory as uniquely reasona-
ble, or as more justified and therefore more worthy of belief than
its rivals, then each theory fails in ways that seem irreparable in
principle.
It is of course impossible within this Article's compass to state
the major arguments for and against each of the theories of legal
obligation noted above, let alone evaluate the cogency of each ob-
jection in particularized fashion. The tenor of the most familiar
arguments can at least be illustrated, however. As against contrac-
tual theories of legal obligation, for example, it is often suggested
REv. 727 (1984) (Jurisprudence Symposium).
'See J. LocmE Two TREATISES OF GovERNMfENT (P. Laslet ed. 1967).
'See Walker, Political Obligation and the Argument From Gratitude, 17 Piim. & PtM.
AFF. 191, 192 (1988).
10 See, e.g., R. FLATHiAN, POLITICAL OBLIGATION 257 (1972). For a contemporary emphasis
on need-fulfillment as a coherent and often practical moral criterion, see generally D.
BRAYBROOKE, MEETING NEEDS (1987).
11 JS. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, in MLL'S ETHICAL WRITINGS 279 (J. Schneewind ed. 1965),
quoted in Frankena, Is Morality Logically Dependent on Religion?, in REIIGION AND MO-
RALITY: A COLLECTON OF ESSAYS 295, 315 (G. Outka & J. Reeder, Jr. eds. 1973).
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that such theories result in far too few persons being morally
bound to obey the law,'2 even in liberal democracies. 3 Contract
theory is criticized as an abstract ideological construct of dubious
relevance to social life as it is. 4
Benefit- or gratitude-based theories of legal obligation have
fared no better. Professor Greenawalt has observed, for example,
that "the relevance of gratitude to the relations between citizen
and state is doubtful and the scope of any duty derived from grati-
tude would be highly uncertain."' 5 It seems that the most signifi-
cant benefits government confers upon us are conferred on us in-
voluntarily 6 or are perhaps antecedently owed to us as moral
rights. Even if gratitude is the response morally called for in such
cases, it is unclear why the form in which our gratitude should be
manifested must include a generalized obligation of obedience."
Even if Frankenstein's monster can rationally feel gratitude for be-
ing created, it is hardly clear why he owes his creator, Dr. Franken-
stein, even a prima facie duty of obedience if the latter is de-
mented. While it is perhaps sensible to feel gratitude toward an
abstract institution,' even a person who has benefitted from the
laws may reasonably feel that the government, as opposed to a uni-
versity, perhaps, is of purely instrumental value, or that the bene-
fits received from the government have been at least equalled by
one's contributions or one's recompense in forms other than grati-
tude-based obedience. Finally, even a net beneficiary of the laws
might feel that she was nonetheless cheated, that the government
hypocritically delivered less than it had somehow promised, thus
12 See R. FLATHMAN, supra note 10, at 209 (remarking that "[o]ne of the standard embar-
rassments of consent and contractarian theories of political obligation is that accepting
them seems to lead to the conclusion that very few people have or have ever had political
obligations"); Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950,
961 (1973) (criticizing on these grounds the Lockean doctrine of tacit consent). At least one
consent theorist has opted simply to accept this dismaying conclusion. See J. TUSSMAN, On-
LIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC 37 (1960). For criticism of Tussman's theory in particular,
see Pitkin, Obligation and Consent-I, 59 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 990, 997-99 (1965).
13 See Simmons, Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic Government, 18 GA. L. REV. 791,
819 (1984) (suggesting that "[e]ven modern liberal democratic governments do not enjoy the
consent of the governed").
14 See, e.g., C. PATEMAN, THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 177 (1979).
15 Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 754.
14 See Smith, supra note 12, at 953.
17 Id.
"8 See Walker, supra note 9, at 197-98.
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negating any gratitude-based obligation to obey.
Finally, need-based or utilitarian theories of legal obligation suf-
fer, partly because of their calculating quality, from the defect of
generating at most an uncomfortably narrow or uncertain obliga-
tion to obey.19 Utilitarian theories of legal obligation do not ex-
plain why we ordinarily view deliberate violations of law as more
serious than other failures to maximize utility, such as the failure
to send money to a worthy charity.20 Far more serious, though, is
the widespread sense, on various grounds, of the inevitable implau-
sibility of any form of utilitarianism as a general moral norm.21 We
do not convict or acquit criminal defendants because it will maxi-
mize net average social utility to do so. Even where utilitarianism
reaches satisfactory results, it seems to do so for the wrong
reasons.22
Increasingly, it has seemed that these diverse attempts to solve
the problem of legal obligation represent not the healthy, creative
ferment of unconstrained inquiry, but some sort of methodological
breakdown. Some sense of this breakdown is conveyed by Profes-
sor Kurt Baler's discussion 3 of the limits of a contract-based solu-
tion to the problem of legal obligation. Professor Baler notes that
an enforceable contract between competent adults undoubtedly es-
tablishes a sort of internal institutional, conventional, positivistic
"bindingness. '2 But this internal institutional bindingness does
not by itself establish any moral duty to carry out one's merely
institutional obligation.25 Other normative premises, in need them-
selves of appropriate support or "proof," are needed. 26 Whether we
19 See Smith, supra note 12, at 967.
20 See Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 754.
21 See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 167-92 (1971); J. Smumrr & B. WaLLIA, UTIU-
TARIAMNSIh FOR AND AGAINST (1973); and, more broadly, Grisez, Against Consequentialism,
23 Am. J. Jums. 21 (1978) and Grisez, Boyle & Finnis, Practical Principles, Moral Truth,
and Ultimate Ends, 32 Ah. J. Jurs. 99 (1987). For a range of approaches to John Stuart
Mill's version of utilitarianism, see J.S. MILL, UTmrrLARIANIS wrIT CRITzcAL ESSAYS (S.
Gorovitz ed. 1971) (including in particular a reprinting of Wasserstrom, The Obligation to
Obey the Law, 10 UCLA L REv. 780 (1963), at 285-305).
2 See, e.g., Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J. SmAr & B. WILLIAm, supra
note 21, at 77-150.
Baier, Obligation: Political and Moral, 12 Nomo& POL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 116
(1970).
24 Id. at 133.
25 Id.
21 Id. at 133 & n.14.
1989] 1001
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
choose a contractual, a benefit-based, or a utilitarian approach to
legal obligation, we are thus led inexorably toward the gulf be-
tween factual premises and moral conclusions. Rightly or not,
David Hume is often credited with recognizing the nonderivability
of moral conclusions, such as a moral obligation to obey the law,
from any combination of factual premises.2 7 While the matter has
been widely debated, especially in the 1960's, it seems clear that
the is-ought gap has not been bridged with consensually persuasive
success.28
However, one can reasonably derive an ought from another
ought. One common approach, therefore, has been to superficially
solve the problem of legal obligation by building powerful norma-
tive assumptions into one's premises. Legal obligation then be-
comes a "second-order" moral problem, with the real work, and
the real controversy, simply being pushed back one stage, to the
level of the premises from which the morally charged legal obliga-
tion is derived.
For example, Professor David Richards argues that "[t]he moral
obligation to obey the law turns on basic justice and free accept-
ance of benefits. ' 29 Professor John Rawls' approach similarly fo-
cuses on the obviously second-order moral requirement that we"comply with and do our share in just institutions when they exist
and apply to us." °3 0 Professor Smith's theory relies upon, among
other things, a prior distinction between acts wrong in themselves,
and acts not wrong in themselves. 31 On such views, the stage of
deriving the obligation to obey the law is no longer itself of great
27 See D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 455-76 (1896).
28 For a mere sampling of a large body of literature, see Donagan, The Scholastic Theory
of Moral Law in the Modern World, in AQUINAS: A COLLEc'rION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 325, 326
(A. Kenny ed. 1969); Flew, On Not Deriving "Ought" From "Is", 24 ANALYSIS 25-32 (1964);
Hudson, The "Is-Ought" Controversy, 25 ANALYSIs 191-95 (1965); Searle, How To Derive
"Ought" From "Is", 73 PHIL. REV. 43-58 (1964); Thomson & Thomson, How Not To Derive
"Ought" From "Is", 73 PHIL. REV. 512-16 (1964); Veatch, The Defense of Natural Law in
the Context of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, 14 Am. J. JURIS. 54, 58-60 (1969).
29 Richards, Conscience, Human Rights, and the Anarchist Challenge to the Obligation
to Obey the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 771, 788 (1984). See also id. at 786 (describing justice, and
hence legal obligation, as dependent upon, among other requirements, "distributive equality
in basic goods of self-respect"). For a more thorough statement of Richards' approach to the
general problem of the just legal order, see D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1986).
30 J. RAWLS, supra note 21, at 334.31 See Smith, supra note 12, at 950.
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interest, at least in comparison with the stage at which it is some-
how determined that the government or society is basically just.
Recognizing this, Professor Joseph Raz went a natural step fur-
ther. He reasoned that if we are to assume that the state is just,
there is no important independent logical work left to be done by
any purported general obligation to obey the law. In a just state,
the obligation to obey "is at best a mere shadow of other moral
duties. It adds nothing to them.""2 A redundant duty to obey is a
nonexistent duty to obey. This extreme conclusion is itself contro-
versial, 3 but it seems plain that the problem of legal obligation has
led ineluctably to broader problems of the just or good society.
Solving the problem of legal obligation in any substantive sense
requires ascertaining at least the general features of the just
society.
Despite a recent burst of philosophical enthusiasm for the at-
tempt, no contemporary effort to identify the basic contours of the
just society has been an acknowledged success. Even the most
widely admired attempt, that of John Rawls, has been mired in
controversial assumptions34  and dubious results.35  The critical
literature is massive and implacable.3 " Perhaps in response, or by
" Raz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHIcs &
PUB. POL'Y 139, 140 (1984). See also J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 233-39 (1979) (denying
even a prima facie obligation to obey the law, even in a just society).
One might argue, for example, that a prima facie obligation of general obedience still
has some role to play even in a generally just society in which it is assumed that there are
independent moral reasons for obeying various laws "on the merits." Such an obligation, for
example,-might tend to reduce the arguably bad net consequences flowing from each actor's
attempts to undeferentially measure the precise moral balance involved in generally obeying
any particular rule, or the merits of obeying a particular law on a particular occasion. Accu-
rately assessing the long-term consequences, the exemplary or demonstration effects, or the
coordination problems engendered by disobedience may require, in Professor Dworkin's par-
lance, a moral Hercules. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L REv. 165, 166
(1982).
U See J. RAWLs, supra note 21, at 146-47 (listing some basic assumptions underlying his"original position" methodology).
13 See id. at 202-03 for perhaps the best-known formulation of Rawls' two principles of
justice. A slightly revised formulation appears in Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Pri-
ority, in 3 THE TANNER LECTURES ON H bmN VALUES 53 (S. McMurrin ed. 1982).
" For the merest sampling of this massive body of literature, see generally B. BARY, THE
LMERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973); READING RAwLs (N. Daniels ed. 1974); M. SANDEL, Lm-
ERALISM AND THE LIMITs OF JUSTI cE (1982); P. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS (1977); Finnis,
The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory, 1 NOTRE DAM
JL., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 115, 128-29 (1984) (noting "IT]here are many principles for order-
ing social life that would not be selected by the self-interested persons in the Original Posi-
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way of clarification, Rawls has more recently sought to scale down
the ambitions of his theory. For example, Rawls' scaled down the-
ory of the just society simply assumes rather than derives, a mod-
ern constitutional democracy."
Other well-known recent essays into the realm of social justice
have certainly fared no better. For example, Robert Nozick has
criticized Professor Rawls' theory from an individual rights-based
perspective, 38 arguing that "[i]ndividuals have rights, and there are
things no person or group may do to them (without violating their
rights). 39 Nozick acknowledges that he "does not present a precise
theory of the moral basis of individual rights."4 0 Actually, it would
be fair to say that Nozick, perhaps recognizing the hopelessness of
the enterprise, simply leaves his spirited assertion of exceptionally
controversial individual rights essentially ungrounded, without any
supporting argumentation or structure.41
Another approach, adopted by Professor Bruce Ackerman, is to
seek a way of uneasily combining a liberal egalitarianism with the
contemporary drift from objectively based morality into relativism
and subjectivism. A crucial move in Ackerman's theory42 comes at
the point in which he asserts that "[n]o reason is a good reason if
it requires the power holder to assert.., that his conception of the
good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens."4 3
Predictably, Ackerman's theory has been cogently challenged."
Other pretenders have achieved similarly limited results. 4
tion.... The Rawlsian theory of fairness... rests on nothing more adequate than an appeal
to individual 'prudence,' in the sense of cautious self-interest"); Smith, supra note 12, at 960
(suggesting that "Rawls' present position lacks intuitive support and... is not one which we
must now accept, on pain of being unreasonable").
31 See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223,
224-25 (1985).
3' See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY. STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
3 Id. at ix.
10 Id. at xiv.
41 See Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1240-41. For a
range of responses to Nozick, see READING NOZICK: ESSAYS ON ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
(J. Paul ed. 1981) (of particular interest is Nagel, Libertarianism Without Foundations, at
191).
42 See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
,1 Id. at 11. For a sense of Ackerman's distributional egalitarianism, see id. at 63.
" See, e.g., the symposium, Social Justice in the Liberal State, 93 ETHICS 328 (1983).
" See, e.g., A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978) and GEWIRTH'S ETHICAL RATIONAL-
ISM (E. Regis ed. 1984); D. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986) and the symposium on
Morals By Agreement, 97 ETHICS 715 (1987), as well as the critical essays in THE Naw So-
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It is too late in the day to pretend that the project of justifying
legal obligation, in either a direct or second-order fashion, requires
only the further refinement of communitarian or broadly liberal
theory for its success. When it is not engaged in the fruitless quest
for such a theory, contemporary philosophy in a different mood
has managed to convince itself that it is impossible "to decide ra-
tionally between incompatible valuational systems and basic moral
principles. In this sense, there can be no justification in ethics."4 6
In such bleak moods, many contemporary philosophers would con-
cede privately that "there are no moral truths, . . . there is no
moral knowledge,' 4 7 and that "all that we can ultimately do is to
commit ourselves, to declare where we stand, to try by persuasion
and rhetoric to bring others to share our point of view.'4 8 This
view of moral conduct as sheer arbitrariness is thought to derive
largely from the absence of any convincing, sufficiently substantive
is-ought entailment relationship, as discussed above.49
The skeptical mood of contemporary philosophers is reflected in
the emerging view that the question of why one ought to obey the
law is either pointless or self-answering. 50 Questions within a par-
ticular social institution or convention, such as whether something
really is the law, are admissible, but questions external to the con-
vention, such as whether one ought not stop one's institutionally
sanctioned complicity in mass atrocities, are not.' As the philoso-
pher John Mackie bluntly put the matter, "[tihere is... no objec-
tively prescriptive obligation to obey the law, for the simple reason
that there are no objectively prescriptive obligations at all. '6 2 Nor-
mative systems, including legal institutions, are thus simply reflec-
CIAL CoNTRACiT: ESSAYS ON GAUTHIER (E. Paul, F. Miller, J. Paul & J. Ahrens eds. 1988).
46 Oppenheim, Justification in Ethics: Its Limitations, in 28 Noios: JusrnFIcAIoN 28, 32
(1986).
" Bambrough, A Proof of the Objectiuity of Morals, 14 At. J. Jumis. 37, 38 (1969) (em-
phasis in the original) (not endorsing this view).
48 Id. (emphasis in the original). This quotation captures something of the flavor of Pro-
fessor Richard Rorty's influential writings in the area of social theory. See. e.g., R. RonRT.
CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
49 Id. See also supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
" See T. MCPHERSON, POLrniCAL OBLIGATION 59 (1967).
" For McPherson's view, see id. at 61, 64-65. This sort of pernicious conventionalism is
also arguably endemic to Professor Richard Rorty's popular theory of liberal pragmatism.
See generally R. RORTY, supra note 48.
2 Mackde, Obligations To Obey the Law, 67 VA. L REv. 143, 143 (1981).
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tive of nothing but convention and human will. 3
The natural reaction to peering into such a profound philosophi-
cal abyss being vertigo, some otherwise illusionless writers draw
back from the full implications of this view. Mackie, for example,
wrote of the possibility of "inventing" an obligation to obey the
law and investing it with varying stringency depending upon the
degree to which the legal system is thought to embody or reflect an
"invented" norm of justice. 4 One suspects that, in practice, an "in-
vented" legal obligation will inevitably be recognized as a nonexis-
tent legal obligation, without practical power to guide authorita-
tively or to bind in any serious sense.""
To say that Mackie's pseudo-ethical system is unstable in prac-
tice is hardly the end of the matter, however. It is not easy to say
what the world would actually look like with all residues of moral
thinking wrung out of it. While a Mother Teresa or an Albert
Schweitzer would not be possible, it seems apparent that a Hitler,
a Stalin, and a Pol Pot also depend, logically and practically, on
moral thinking, however deranged. Instead of engaging in unceas-
ing, self-destructive, internecine depredations, a thoroughly demor-
alized society would perhaps unanimously choose to plug into the
closest technologically available approach to a perpetual gratifica-
tion machine," on the assumption that such a machine promised a
better deal than living out one's life in more familiar fashion.
A world without legal or any other sort of binding obligation
would thus probably not be one of ceaseless waves of violent con-
flict. To our tastes, however, imbued as we are with essentially
moral concerns for human dignity, for human and civil rights, and
11 See Leff, supra note 41, at 1229-30. For what might be seen as an extended response to
Professor Left's thesis, see Smolin, The Judaeo-Christian Tradition and Self-Censorship in
Legal Discourse, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345 (1988). See also Neuhaus, The Moral Delegi-
timization of Law, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 51 (1989).
" Mackie, supra note 52, at 144, 151-58. More generally, see J. MACKIE, ETHICS: IN-
VENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977).
15 See the critique of Mackie on this point in Marshall, Inventing the Obligation to Obey
the Law, 67 VA. L. REV. 159, 173-75 (1981). For responses to Mackie's arguments of "queer-
ness" against the objectivity of moral judgments generally, see, e.g., J. FINNIS, FUNDAMIEN-
TALS OF ETHICS 57 (1983) and Finnis, Scepticism, Self-Refutation, and the Good of Truth,
in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY. ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.LA. HART 247 (P. Hacker & J, Raz
eds. 1977); Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 1061, 1117-36 (1988). See also Gold-
sworthy, God or Mackie? The Dilemma of Secular Moral Philosophy, 30 AM. J, Junis. 43
(1985).
"e See R. NozICK, supra note 38, at 42-45.
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for the sanctity of fundamental liberties, the appeal of such a
world is limited. Yet, at least as the argument has thus far been
developed, we may have no intellectually honest choice in the mat-
ter. As Professor Leff expressed the point, "[t]here is no way to
prove one ethical or legal system superior to any other, unless at
some point an evaluator is asserted to have the final... word.""
Selecting such a final evaluator from among other possible candi-
dates, even if done by consensus, will of course ordinarily be
merely one more choice not evidently more reasonable in any ob-
jective sense than any other. This Article will argue below, how-
ever, that reason holds open the possibility of leading us to a Final
Evaluator of such character that looking to that Final Evaluator as
a unique source of authentically binding moral and legal obligation
becomes itself a uniquely reasonable, nonarbitrary course.
I. THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE NATURAL LAW SOLUTIONS TO THE
PROBLEM OF LEGAL OBLIGATION
If the possibility of a natural law-oriented solution to the prob-
lem of legal obligation seems alien to us, this can hardly be attribu-
table to any historical insignificance of natural law theorizing. A
natural law approach of one sort or another is famously associated
with Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, 9 but any number of other
ancient and modern writers might be said to fall within the broad
tradition. 0 A representative listing might include Epictetus,6' Cic-
11 Leff, supra note 41, at 1240.
See, e.g., THE ETHICS OF ARiSTOTuL (J. Thomson trans. 1953).
"Probably the central focus of Aquinas' writings on law and on the natural law in partic-
ular would be the First Part of the Second Part of the Summa Theologica, Questions 90-95.
Among the most convenient and accessible translations are found in Tim PoLncAL IDEAS OF
ST. THOMAs AQuiNAs (D. Bigongiari ed. 1953) and, more broadly, AN AQuiNAs READER (M.
Clark ed. 1972). The literature is massive. Representative accessible shorter pieces would
include F. COPLESTON, AQUINAs (1955); IL MchNERNY, ETHIcA THo rISTicA: TnE MORAL PHI-
LOSOPHY OF THOMAs AQUINAs (1982); D. O'CoNNoR, AQUINAS AND NATURAL LAw (1967);
Chroust, The Philosophy of Law of St. Thomas Aquinas: His Fundamental Ideas and
Some of His Historical Precursors, 19 AM. J. Jus. 1 (1974); Damich, The Essence of Law
According to Thomas Aquinas, 30 AM. J. Jums. 79 (1985); Grisez, The First Principle of
Practical Reason, 10 NAT. L.F. 168 (1965); MacGuigan, St. Thomas and Legal Obligation, 35
NEw SCHoLASTICIsM 281 (1961); May, The Meaning and Nature of the Natural Law in
Thomas Aquinas, 22 AM. J. Jum. 168 (1977).
60 For brief historical surveys and commentary, see, e.g., A. D'ENTR , NATURAL LAW (2d
ed. 1970); Y. SIMON, THE TRADION OF NATURAL LAw (1965); Gerhart, The Doctrine of Nat-
ural Law, 26 N.Y.U. L REv. 76 (1951). See also the more narrowly focused Rose, The Law of
Nature: An Introduction to American Legal Philosophy, 13 Oto ST. L. 121 (1952).
" See DiscouRsEs AND ENCHMIDION OF EPICTETIus 230 (T, H.ig-:.1, zr,-m rt.. ed- 1890)
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ero, 2 Augustine,63 Hobbes,"4 Locke,65 and Montesquieu. 6  For a
time, American constitutional law bore, to some degree, the im-
print of natural law theorizing."1
The contemporary disdain for natural law theorizing is partially
based upon common misconceptions. One can hardly convict natu-
ral law theorizing based on the allegedly implausible, but inessen-
tial, conclusions of even the most eminent natural law theorists.
(stating in The Enchiridion that "every creature is naturally formed to flee and abhor
things that appear hurtful and that which causes them; and to pursue and admire those
which appear beneficial and that which causes them").
62 See CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH (G. Sabine & S. Smith trans. 1929) in which Lae-
lius argues that:
There is in fact a true law-namely, right reason-which is in accordance with
nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands
this law summons men to the performance of their duties; by its prohibitions it
restrains them from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibitions always influ-
ence good men, but are without effect upon the bad.
Id. at 215-16.
It seems evident that Cicero conceives of a natural law utterly distinct from the sense in
which, for example, force is related to mass and acceleration of a physical body. Cicero
further specifies that God "is the author of this law, its interpreter, and its sponsor." Id. at
216.
63 See Chroust, The Fundamental Ideas in St. Augustine's Philosophy of Law, 18 AM, J.
JURIS. 57 (1973). Convenient translations include THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE
(H. Paolucci ed. 1962) and, more broadly, AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD (G. Walsh trans.
1958).
6 See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 3d printing 1943) (1651) (posit-
ing as the "Fundamentall Law of Nature" that "every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as
farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and
use, all helps, and advantages of Warre").
6" See J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Second Treatise § 6, at 289 (P. Laslett
2d ed. 1967) (1689). Locke argues that the law of nature is reason, and that:
Reason ... teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that all being equal
and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or
Possessions. For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infi-
nitely wise Maker; all the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the
World by his order and about his business, they are his Property, whose Work-
manship they are, made to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure.
Id.
66 See 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 4 (T. Nugent trans. Robert Clarke & Co. ed.
1873) (1748) (laws of nature are so called "because they derive their force entirely from our
frame and existence"); McArthur, The Natural Law: A Perennial Problem, 26 AM. J. Jumls.
1, 9 (1981).
6'7 See generally Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law
(pts. 1 & 2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928-1929). For an explicit adoption of natural law
theorizing in a judicial context, see the opinion of Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
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For example, it is unnecessary for the natural law theorist to claim
that an unjust positive law, or a law not in accordance with God's
will, is therefore not a law in any sense.6 Similarly, a natural law
theorist need not infer from the injustice of a particular law that
persons subject to such a law are best counseled to therefore diso-
bey the law, whatever the cost in disruption and scandal.,
Further, natural law theorizing need not implausibly assume
that even the general contents of the natural law are universally
apprehended intuitively or innately by every person, or by every
rational person.70 Nor need the natural law theorist assume some
unchanging distinctive essence of humankind, invariant as to time
and place,71 or that persons are usefully conceived of only as iso-
lated asocial individuals,72 or that reason is the essence of human-
kind. It is therefore mistaken to assume that natural law theory
must require uniform, invariant behavior1' at all times and all
places. 6 In this sense, natural law theory is capable of accommo-
dating whatever is of genuine value in modern trends toward sub-
jectivism and moral relativism.
It is precisely the sensitivity of natural law theory to historical
and social context that accounts, in part, for what is sometimes
taken to be the disappointingly broad, even vacuous character of
See Damich, supra note 59, at 79-80. But see L WEINREB, NATURAL LAW A JusTcE
260-61 (1987) (depicting natural law as allegedly insensitive to the role of convention in
determining the law).
11 But cf. L WEINREB, supra note 68, at 263 (noting existence of established law as brake
on disorder). Aquinas, however, seems sensitive to the costs of even righteously inspired
social disorder in the First Part of the Second Part of the Summa Theologica, Question 96,
Fourth Article. See THE POLTICAL IDEAS OF ST. THoMtAs AQUINAS, supra note 59 (stating
unjust laws "do not bind in conscience, except perhaps to avoid scandal or disturbance").
70 See May, supra note 59, at 175, 185. See also Y. SIMON, supra note 60, at 162 (noting
"[a]cquaintance with natural law is normally as progressive in mankind as anything else").
Simon cogently adds that the possibility of progress is not the inevitability of progress; our
knowledge of and conformance to the dictates of the deontological or teleological aspects of
the natural law may decline historically. See id.
71 See Carney, Outline of a Natural Law Procedure For Christian Ethics, 47 J. RELGIO.
26, 31-32 (1967).
72 Id. at 33.
71 See Hauerwas, Natural Law, Tragedy, and Theological Ethics, 20 Am. J. Jums. 1, 3
(1975).
", See McInerney, The Principles of Natural Law, 25 AL. J. JwuRs. 1, 7 (1980) (stating
that "the natural law view is precisely the view that there is an all but numberless variety of
ways in which men can attain their completeness or perfection as men").13 See Carney, supra note 71, at 29; Chroust, supra note 59, at 31-32.
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the most widely cited purported injunctions of the natural law,'1
and the alleged absence of appropriate guidance in applying its
general injunctions to particular circumstances." In this, the
precepts of the natural law resemble the great constitutional com-
mands of due process, equal protection, freedom of speech, and
avoidance of cruel and unusual punishments. Many particular
moral decisions will not be logically derived from broad principles
of natural law78 precisely because of our grossly imperfect, if per-
haps haltingly improving, understanding of the morally reievant
facts concerning persons and society. We should therefore not be
surprised to see natural law theorists reaching contradictory re-
sults,79 or adopting doubtful o or even embarrassing81 moral con-
clusions, even over substantial periods of time.
This is not to suggest that the natural law is, if otherwise sound,
always devoid of power to guide and to bind under conditions of
imperfect social knowledge. If one takes as one's premise the in-
junction to love one's neighbor or to do no murder, one may ordi-
narily infer that one ought not to torture a small child to death
merely for the sake of passing amusement, regardless of the social
circumstances or our residual ignorance of human physiology and
psychology. One can draw this practical inference with more confi-
dence and certainty than could underlie any argument that such
an inference leads to moral wrong. We must not oversell the capac-
ity of natural law theorizing to generate determinate moral results,
however, whether in terms of right or wrong conduct or good br
bad states of affairs. The advantage of natural law theorizing lies
not in its character as a prolific generator of satisfying concrete
7 See Perkins, Natural Law in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, 17 AM. J. JURIS. 111,
116 (1972).
7 See Fortin, Natural Law and Social Justice, 30 Am. J. JuRIs. 1, 6 (1985) (asserting that
"[n]owhere does the New Testament give us any specific rules to live by or any inkling as to
how the general rules that it does give us might apply to society at large").
78 See Goldberg, Natural Law: Some Considerations, 10 MOD. AGE 269, 270 (1966).
79 See Constable, What Good Is Natural Law? A Lawyer's Perspective, 26 Am. J. JURIs.
66, 70 (1981).
80 See, e.g., Constable, What Does Natural Law Jurisprudence Offer?, 4 CATH. UL. REv.
1, 13 (1954) (citing example of "the large competitor driving smaller but more efficient pro-
ducers out of business"). Presumably, the morally correct response to such alleged activity
may become clear only once our economic theory reaches a certain level of sophistication.
See P. BAUER, REALITY AND RHETORIc 73-79 (1984).
81 See Gewirth, The Ontological Basis of Natural Law: A Critique and an Alternative, 29
AM. J. JURIS. 95, 115 (1984) (noting that Aristotle and Aquinas supported natural slavery).
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answers to moral dilemmas. Instead, natural law provides more
reasonably justified moral injunctions than do its putative rivals.
Some versions of natural law theorizing are, admittedly, wrecked
on the same logical shoals on which the various pretending theories
in the previous section foundered. The term "natural law" is used
in a variety of senses, some of which are so attenuated as to rise no
higher than the various theories of legal and moral obligation dis-
cussed above.82 Many natural law writers disavow, or disclaim any
reliance on, any explicit theist element of the theory. Joseph Tuss-
man, for example, holds that "[t]he fate of natural law as a politi-
cal doctrine should not be made to depend on the existence of an'objective order of nature' on the one hand or the existence of a
command-giving deity on the other. '83 If there has been any gen-
eral historical trend in this regard, it is evidently in the direction
of a less functional or even nonexistent role for God in the natural
law.8 4
Natural law theory that discounts the role of God tends, quite
understandably, to exalt the role of nature itself. Charles Fried has
written, for example, that natural law theory should be understood
to focus on the claim that "every entity exhibits a rationally ascer-
tainable nature, by virtue of which it is... the very entity which it
is and not something else.... [I]t is this nature which is normative
for that entity. ' s5 Normativity is, in such versions of natural law
theory, thought to derive from the essence or the very nature, as
rationally ascertained, of the being in question. 6 What humans
ought to do, what they are morally bound to do, flows from their
distinctive nature.
Lon Fuller, for example, characterizes his "internal morality of the law" approach, in a
sense, as one of natural law, but not in a substantive, let alone theistic, sense. See L
FU=Lit, THE MoRALrry OF LAW 96 (1964). Ronald Dworkin, as well, adopts the classification
of "natural law" for his own jurisprudence on the assumption that "any theory which makes
the content of law sometimes depend on the correct answer to some moral question" can
qualify as a natural law theory. Dworkin, supra note 33, at 165. In such a view, an aggressive
rule-utilitarian, who believes that his morality is correct and at least occasionally determines
the content of the law, counts as a natural law theorist.
"3J. TussmAN, supra note 12, at 129 (1960). This reflects the widespread impression that
the binding quality of moral right and wrong is independent of the nature and existence of
God. See, e.g., R. AnAhTs, THE VmTuE OF FArrH 147 (1987).
" See Niemeyer, What Price "Natural Law'?, 27 Ahs J. Jums. 1, 5 (1982).
Fried, Natural Law and the Concept of Justice, 74 ETHics 237, 241 (1964).
SO See, e.g., Gewirth, supra note 81, at 96; Machan, Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Nat-
ural Law Theory, 31 ANL J. Jums. 65, 66 (1986).
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Waiving all other possible objections, though, it is clear that this
sort of natural law theory cannot bridge the gap between "is" and"ought" any more successfully than the candidates examined
above.8 7 Doubtless there may be some linkage between our nature
and that to which we may be morally obligated. It is hard to see,
for example, how we could be morally obligated to do something
which is simply beyond the unalterable limits set by our capacities
or our nature.88 But beyond this, the choice for acting in accord
with, or "fulfilling," one's nature seems either to be utterly inevita-
ble and no moral choice at all, or else to involve sheer question-
begging, or an utterly gratuitous choice grounded on reasons no
more cogent than those underlying any alternative choice. The
question of why we ought to act in accordance with our nature cer-
tainly seems like an intelligible, nonself-answering question. There
should, it seems, be a substantive answer, but no cogent answer
appears. It would seem no less reasonable to determine that the
way one is by nature is merely the way one happens to be, and that
one's nature is, in this respect, utterly without moral status.8 e One
might coherently go further and announce, on the basis of some set
of premises, that one's essential, unalterable nature is actually
morally bad, and should morally be resisted, suppressed, or morti-
fied, however futilely. On such a view, the nature of the human
person should not be endorsed, or even accommodated, but
overcome.90
Any number of variations of natural law theory, then, are fatally
vulnerable to the is-ought problem, and cannot be established as
better grounded in reason, or as somehow more justified, than any
of their competitors. Some natural law approaches, however, are"unequivocally God-centered." 91 If the gap between is and ought
can be defensibly bridged anywhere, this would seem uniquely pos-
sible in distinctively theocentric versions of the natural law. 2
" See supra notes 27-45 and accompanying text.
88 In this sense, "ought" is said to imply "can." See R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 51
(1963).
8 Thus, Professor Tussman observes in particular that even an assumedly universal
human tendency toward self-preservation does not itself imply any moral duty to protect or
to preserve oneself. See J. TUSSMAN, supra note 12, at 130.
90 See F. Nm'TzsCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 75 (R. Hollingdale trans. 1969).
" See Barrett, A Lawyer Looks at Natural Law Jurisprudence, 23 AM. J. Junis. 1, 6
(1978).
'" See, e.g., Wilhemsen, The Natural Law, Religion, and the Crisis of the Twentieth Cen-
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III. A TimisTIc SOLUTION AS THE ON POSSIBLE SOLUTION
The physicist Stephen Hawking notes in his popular work, A
Brief History of Time,93 that some of our most cherished physical
law formulations and conceptual distinctions tend to break down
in the geographic proximity of a black hole.94 This Article analo-
gously suggests that, in plain terms, the fact-value distinction loses
its utility in the vicinity of God. It is beyond the scope of this pa-
per to establish precisely which combination of divine attributes
makes this so. Assuming for the moment that a God of a familiar
sort exists, it becomes decisive for the question of legal obligation
that God is not merely an exceptionally knowledgeable, or thor-
oughly seasoned, decisionmaker, much less that God is merely
powerful, with the ability to offer great rewards or impose severe
punishments for obedience or disobedience to his commands.
In light of God's assumed qualities, it should be clear that a the-
istic natural law theory need not trivialize the problem of legal ob-
ligation by arbitrarily defining God, or God's commands, roughly
as "that which successfully bridges the is-ought gap and is there-
fore a source of binding legal obligation." Merely defining God as
the source of moral bindingness is uninteresting and unnecessary.
Theistic natural law theory genuinely can bridge the is-ought gap,
unlike, for example, a theory that seeks to derive a morally binding
obligation to obey the most powerful single person, in virtue
merely of that person's power. Might does not necessarily make
right.
There is thus a substantive answer possible to the perfectly sen-
tury, 10 MOD. AGE 146 (1966) (suggesting that natural law theorizing can be efficacious, or
motivating, not in its secular versions, but insofar as it draws its normative force ultimately
from a God understood in a particular way). Theistic writers have often assumed that some
moral arguments are well-justified and binding independent of the existence or nature of
God. See, e.g., R SWINBURNE, FMrH AND REAsON 78 (1981). Professor Swinburne is led into
arguments supporting a moral obligation to obey God that parallel those of secular ethicists.
One such argument is that God is morally entitled to exact general, perpetual obedience
from man because God created manldnd. Id. at 79-80. Another is that we have an obligation
to obey and worship God as a distinctively appropriate and required mode of response to
the great benefits conferred on us, however independently of our wishes, by God. Unless we
take God's unique characteristics into consideration, these arguments are no more rationally
convincing than the opposing ones. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discuss.
ing the argument from gratitude in context of legal obligation).
93 S. HAwKING, A BRiEF HISToRY OF TIME (1988).
Id. at 61.
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sible question of why one reasonably ought to feel morally bound
to obey the will of the posited sort of God."5 By "morally binding,"
we need not mean something like "commanded or willed by God."
Rather, our approach is that once some subset of the nature, quali-
ties, or attributes of the presumed God are appropriately under-
stood, along with any relevant facts about persons, society, and our
factual relationship to God, then a logically satisfactory account of
the moral basis of legal obligation can emerge.
Some have argued that unless the problem is simply defined
away, no account of God's nature, however supplemented by facts
about the world, can suffice to generate a logically satisfactory
moral obligation. On such an argument, even if it is asserted that,
for example, God knows all that can be known, and is benevolent
toward us, we must still test the truth value of such a claim by use
of our own independent moral standards. A claim for God's benev-
olence in a world of universal, permanent, extreme, mind-numbing
torment from the moment of birth onward would on such a theory
simply be implausible. The case for obeying such a God would be
weakened by application of our own independent moral
standards."'
It has been argued in response that a free, self-sustaining, and
omniscient God, whose powers of choice were not relevantly lim-
ited and who suffered from no factual weakness or dependency,
simply would not choose to issue immoral commands to anyone. °7
Those who argue for the need for an independently grounded, ob-
jective morality apart from God would be left to explain how a
God thus described could conceivably commit what would look like
a moral mistake.
Even if we must go through an independent process of passing
judgment upon the sort of God described or upon His commands,
however, this does not establish that there must be some morality
"I For an historical expression of doubt on this point, see the brief discussion of Richard
Price's view in Frankena, Is Morality Dependent on Religion?, in RELIGION AND MORALITY,
supra note 11, at 295, 302-03.
91 See K. NIELSEN, ETHICS WITHOUT GOD 14-15 (1973). Such a view seems to flow from the
ancient conundrum asking whether God commands us in certain ways because such ways
are morally good independent of God's will, or whether such ways are morally good simply
because God commands them. For one statement of this rather misleading set of options,
see Goldberg, supra note 78, at 273.
"' See R. SWINBURNE, THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 97-98 (1979).
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that is both independent of God and that is itself a rationally de-
fensible solution to the is-ought problem. If we are to presume to
independently "check up on" God's commands, we can do so on
the basis merely of our own intuitions, desires, preferences, and
tastes. Even if we happen to find that a particular command of
God is distasteful, there is certainly no guarantee that such a re-
vulsion is distinctively moral, let alone a distinctively well-justified
and well-grounded moral judgment sufficient to overcome the is-
ought problem 8 We have reason to believe, in fact, that no such
essentially secular morality can in reality be distinctively well-
grounded. 9
Suppose, then, that the requisite sort of God exists and that cer-
tain legal requirements and prohibitions can be determined to be
in accord with God's will or God's very nature and qualities.
Would it not still be reasonable to engage in an admittedly
doomed but allegedly heroic Promethean or Nietzschean revolt
against the authority of God? Would defiance of God be no less
reasonable than obedience? The answer is plainly no. We are as-
suming at this point that God is benevolent toward us, and that
God knows everything that could be relevant to any moral judg-
ment, including our own tastes and personal preferences and the
importance each of us may attach to individual human freedom
and dignity. All that could be relevant is known to a God who
wishes us well, and whose motives, perceptions, and capacity for
judgment are at this point assumed to be flawless. What we as
humans can know, as well as our capacity to translate our various
kinds of knowledge into legitimate action-directing imperatives, is
thus inevitably at best only a proper subset of, or inferior to, God's
knowledge and capacities. On these assumptions, law that is conso-
nant with God's nature or will is not rationally subject to correc-
tion by human judgment.100 To defy God in this respect is cer-
tainly possible, but it is to choose the undeniably lesser rather than
the greater, while still pretending to aim at the greater. Such a
88 See Adams, A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness, in RELcGoN
AND MoRALrrY, supra note 11, at 318, 330-31.
" See supra notes 27-45 and accompanying text.
100 In this sense, our relationship to God is unlike that of child to parent, in which it is at
least possible that the parent's commands may be subject to morally sound correction by
the child, as when the parent is ignorant of something the child knows, or the parent's moral
judgment is clouded for some reason.
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course of conduct is no more reasonable than asserting that five is
less than four within the conventional assumptions of arithmetic.
The logic of this paper has led, then, to the conclusion that if the
familiar sort of God exists,' then He is the sole possible source of
obligation. If He does not exist, there can be no rationally binding
moral obligation in a legal context. This paper cannot, of course,
hope to validate the larger claim that "God is the basis of obliga-
tion. ' 10 2 But something should be said in response to those who
assume that it is impossible to build any kind of reasonable case
for the existence of the sort of God described above.
This Article will thus briefly refer to recent scholarship sug-
gesting that despite the obvious historical lack of consensus re-
garding the existence of God, there is no reason to suppose that all
varieties of investigation and reflection on this question must be
pointless from the standpoint of rational persuasion.10 3  The
probability of God's existence, and hence the reasonableness of be-
lief, is not exclusively a matter of nonrational faith on the one
hand0 4 or of strict deductive proof on the other.105
101 Monotheism does seem required for our purposes. If there is a genuine plurality of
irreconcilable gods, the possibility of conflicting, mutually incompatible moral directives
seems unavoidable.
102 J. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 407 (1980). For general responses to the
basic approach taken by Finnis, see R. HITTINGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL LAW
THEORY (1987); George, Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371
(1988) (reviewing L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE (1987) and R. HITTINGEIn, supra).
103 See R. SWINBURNE, supra note 92, at 64, 83-87 (1981). For the sake of simplicity of
exposition, this Article treats any doubts as to the sheer logical coherence of theism as going
to the probability of its truth. For discussions3 of the logical coherence issue, see, e.g., R.
SWINBURNE, THE COHERENCE OF THEISM (1977); B. MITCHELL, THE JUSTIFICATION OF RELI-
GIOUS BELIEF 7-20 (1973).
I10 For writers such as Kierkegaard, logical thought, science, and philosophy are certainly
meritorious and valuable. See S. KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT 46, 54,
135 (D. Swenson & W. Lowrie trans. 1968). But for Kierkegaard, faith is not a matter of
reason or evidence in any familiar sense, but is, instead, a matter of intense subjectivity, of
the passion of inwardness, of mystery and paradox, id. at 33, 172-79, whether rightly di-
rected in an objective sense or not. Id. at 179-80. Others have suggested, however, that
"faith operates by means of reason, and reason is directed and corrected by faith." J, NEW-
MAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY 281 (1927). See generally J. NEWMAN, A REASON FOR TIlE
HOPE WITHIN (1985). If there are mysteries inherent within, for example, the Christian faith,
they need not be viewed as so decisive and so capricious as to call for a sacrifice of the
intellect. See K. RAHNER, FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH 12 (W. Dych trans. 1978). Nor, it
should be pointed out by way of analogy, is our reasonable belief in the capacities of science
decisively undermined by science's continuing inability to account, for example, for the mys-
tery of creation. Leaving God to one side does not seem to improve our chances of under-
standing how matter or energy in the universe got here in the first place, or how it makes
sense to say that some form of matter or energy was "always" here. See J. POLKINGHORNE,
SCIENCE AND CREATION 58-60 (1989).
10I For a generally critical view of the classical deductive proofs of the existence of God,
1016
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Probabilistic or inductive arguments for the existence of God are
of course hardly new. Arguments from plausibility or implausibil-
ity of a rudimentary sort are common even in writers, such as Pas-
cal, 106 who believe that reason itself cannot lead to or prove first
principles.1" ' Probabilistic arguments themselves need not refer to
the plausibility of particular events in human history,10 8 but may
refer to matters as broad as the sheer unlikeliness of intelligent life
arising from undirected random processes.109
see generally A. KENNY, THE FIVE WAY& SAINT THOtnAS AQumAS' PROOFS OF GOD'S EXis-
TENCE (1969). For contemporary attempts at a proof of God's existence not relying on the
inductive use of probabilities, see, e.g., D. BRAIN, THE REALrrY OF TtE AND THE ExISTENME
OF GOD (1988); G. GsusEz, BEYOND THE NEw THIm (1975). One might in fact reasonably
submit that if God's existence were rationally strictly demonstrable, it would be inconsistent
with other things we believe about God. First, the existence of a knockdown deductive argu-
ment in favor of God's existence would seem to imply that we should expect heaven to be
populated disproportionately by logicians, or by those with a talent for abstraction. See S.
KIERKEGAARD, supra note 104, at 337. More evenhandedly, God could presumably provide
an exceptionally powerful, if not decisive, argument for his own existence by spelling out
His name with the stars in legible fashion, for example. But we have some reason to believe
that such a celestial billboard would be incompatible with human dignity and human choice
and would reduce a gradual process of potentially progressive human appreciation of the
Creator into a more mechanical, superficial, ultimately less meaningful affair. See R. SwiN-
BURNS, supra note 97, at 185-86, 240-41.
100 See B. PASCAL, PENStES 125 (A.J. Krailsheimer trans. 1966) (suggesting the implausi-
bility of an apparently pointless, extremely risky, and exceedingly vulnerable twelve-person
conspiracy on the part of the Disciples to propagate a concocted story). Pascal's famous
wager appeals of course to probabalistic calculations. Id. at 149-53.
107 Id. at 58.
10s For a contemporary example of such an argument, see R Sw NiuRNE, supra note 97, at
225-26.
108 Stephen Hawking, for example, notes suggestively that-
The laws of science, as we know them at present, contain many fundamental
numbers, like the size of the electric charge of the electron and the ratio of the
masses of the proton and the electron.... The remarkable fact is that the
values of these numbers seem to have been very finely adjusted to make possi-
ble the development of life.... [I]t seems clear that there are relatively few
ranges of values for the numbers that would allow the development of any
form of intelligent life.
S. HAWKING, supra note 93, at 125. It is possible to respond to such an argument by replying
in essence that since we're here, all those values must of course be that way, else we
wouldn't be around to observe them. This is true, but does not make the numbers any less
remarkable. See R. SWINBURNE, supra note 97, at 137-38. For further discussion of Professor
Hawking's reasoning, see Leslie, How to Draw Conclusions From a Fine-Tuned Cosmos, in
PHYsIcs, PHILOSOPHY, AND THEOLOGY 297-310 (R. Russell, W. Stoeger & G. Coyne eds. 1988).
One might avoid the theistic suggestiveness of the immense improbability of life in the uni-
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A number of believers have gone on to build the range and vari-
ety of probabilistic arguments into a broader, cumulative case.n °
The cumulative case has also been argued to be somehow system-
atic, or mutually reinforcing among its elements."' In such a cu-
mulative and mutually reinforcing case, the argument itself need
not be essentially hierarchical. Instead, the cumulative case could
be holistic. 112 A belief in proposition P may be justified by P's co-
herence with proposition Q, and a belief in proposition Q justified
in turn because of the way Q coheres with p. 11 3 It has been said
that "[a]ny belief, moral or factual, is justified only by showing
that it coheres well with everything else one believes.' ' 1 4 The trick
of course is to avoid narrow, closed, ad hoc cycles of mutual sup-
port among propositions.
Some contemporary theorists, such as the philosopher Richard
Swinburne, construct their case for the probability of God in an
almost mechanical, additive way. They add to or subtract from the
verse by the expedient of claiming that there are in fact an immense number of poorly
connected "universes," only a very few of which are hospitable to life. For general discus-
sion, see P. DAVIES, GOD AND THE NEW PHYSICS (1983). J. GRIBBIN & M. REES, COSMIC COINCI-
DENCES (1989); H. MONTEFOIRE, THE PROBABILITY OF GOD (1985); J. POLKINGHORNE, supra
note 104.
"1 See, e.g., B. MITCHELL, THE JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 39-40 (1981) (main-
taining that "[w]hat has been taken to be a series of failures [to establish definitively by
separate isolated arguments a rational defense of Christianity] when treated as attempts at
purely deductive or inductive argument could well be better understood as contributions to
a cumulative case").
" Id. at 40; G.K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY (1908). Chesterton appreciates that the
weight of each separate probabilistic argument may be modest in isolation, id. at 143, but he
goes on to detect an almost aesthetic rightness, or fitness, or non-arbitrary, non-gratuitous,
verisimilitudinous quality, to many religious tenets where one initially might expect other-
wise. Id. at 81-101. For an analogous argument, see C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 55-56
(rev. ed. 1952). For a sense, however, of the remarkable fallibility of human beings in even
the most mundane uses of induction and probability, see generally JUDGMENT UNDER UN-
CERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky eds. 1982). Note
that it is useful for some purposes, including our own, to explore or to assert the probability
of God's existence, without suggesting that it is appropriate that anyone's faith, or their
trust in God, be based even in part on the evidences of fallible human reason.
.. For a contemporary statement of such an approach, see G. HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW:
PRINCIPLES OF REASONING 32-33 (1986).
"I Id. at 33. For a rejection of coherentism generally, as well as of the more specific claim
that coherentism is incompatible with theistic belief, see Plantinga, Coherentism and the
Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God, in RATIONALITY, RELIGIOUS BELIEF, AND MORAL
COMMITMENT 109 (R. Audi & W. Wainwright eds. 1986). For a broader context, see generally
THE RATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF (W. Abraham & S. Holtzer eds. 1987).
11 Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 1061, 1112-13.
1018
NATURAL LAW
overall probability of the existence of God in light of particular
arguments that seem to make God's existence more or less proba-
ble than it would otherwise be.115 Others, such as the philosopher
Alvin Plantinga, maintain that there can be no classically rigorous
argument for a "properly basic" belief in God, and further deny
that the existence of God is in any sense self-evident. Yet, they
continue to argue that beliefs entailing the existence of God can be
rational, or reasonable, or right and proper.118 In such a view, in-
ductive reasoning may guide us to the particular necessary and
sufficient conditions for a "properly basic" belief in God, and
Plantinga continues to hold open the possibility of fairly and neu-
trally convicting the atheist of some inductive or deductive error in
failing to include belief in God within his set of "properly basic"
beliefs.117 Belief in God would not, on such an approach, be arbi-
trary, irrational, or unjustified. 18
The elaborate, subtle argumentation of writers such as Richard
Swinburne must be evaluated on its own merits, at length. It is
cited here not for its truth or for its power to persuade rationally.
Rather, it is cited to illustrate that the problem of the existence of
the kind of God necessary to ground adequately a moral obligation
to obey the law is one on which genuine, constructive progress can
be made. We need not, for example, be perennially stuck at the
stage of unresolvable disputes over whether any of Aquinas' deduc-
tive arguments really work. Traditional obstacles to belief in the
requisite sort of God, such as the problem of evil in the world 9
"' See R. SWiNBURNE, supra note 97, at 14, 290-91; Swinburne, Afachie, Induction, and
God, 19 RELIGIOUS STUD. 385 (1983). See also H. MONTEFIOPE, supra note 109."1 See Plantinga, Reason and Belief in God, in FArrH AND RATIONALITY 16, 17, 73-91
(1983). See also the briefer discussion by Wolterstorff, Can Belief in God Be Rational If It
Has No Foundations?, in id. at 135, 175.
117 See Plantinga, supra note 116, at 77-78.
Ie It seems entirely possible that in working out his approach, Plantinga could draw upon
some or all of the various sorts of inductive arguments discussed supra notes 106-11 and
accompanying text. Plantinga's approach has certainly not yet been fully deployed and con-
vincingly used in concrete terms. See A. KENNY, FArTH AND REASON 16 (1983).
29 For a concise, vivid assertion of God's alleged apparent indifference to humans and to
their temporal suffering, see Vivas, Animadversions Upon the Doctrine of Natural Law, 10
MOD. AGE 149, 154 (1966). For a sophisticated response, emphasizing the importance to
human dignity of human choice for good and evil, and of the capacity for gradual human
progress, beyond the role of suffering in teaching perspective and discouraging vanity, see,
e.g., R. SWINBURNE, supra note 97, at 185-87, 199. For further argument, see generally A.
PLANTINGA, GOD, FREEDOM AND Evn. (1974); Flemming, Omnibenevolence and Evil, 96 ETmt.
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and the conflict between divine foreknowledge and human freedom
and moral responsibility, 120 admittedly continue to loom large.
There is, however, no clear reason to envision all future debate on
such controversial matters as a vain, nonprogressive shouting
match. To the extent that a rational case for the existence of such
a God can be developed, cogently justifying the existence of a
moral obligation to obey the law becomes not merely possible, but
probable.
ics 261 (1986).
120 For such an argument, see A. KENNY, REASON AND RELIGION: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPIIICAL
THEOLOGY 121-34 (1987). The alleged incompatibility rests on the controversial premise that
God's knowledge of our actions can accurately be described as "in time," and specifically
antecedent to our act, rather than being outside, or not bounded by time. The conflict is
then produced by the controversial assumption that person A's knowledge of, or ability to
predict, person B's future action, means that B's action was not free in a sense sufficient to
establish moral responsibility on the part of B.
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